In light of recent events it stands to reason that questions are going to be asked and explanations sought in the search for understanding. Jean Todt has called for an enquiry to discover what the contributing factors were in the moments leading up to the final conclusion on that Sunday morning. Therefore we have to ask the question, whether F1 has slipped into a period of complacency with regard to driver safety - or where increasingly risky driving patterns are becoming more inherent within the sport and it's junior categories. We have to assess which factors came together allowing such an incident to occur at the highest level of motorsport, and what solutions can be put in place to ensure something like this doesn't happen again.
Throughout recent history - measured as the time from the first race I sat and set eyes upon in 1997 to present day - severe injuries for drivers have thankfully been exceptionally rare. In that same time span there have been many dramatic incidents, from the 13 car 98 Spa pile-up, to both BAR's rolling over in the middle of Eau Rouge and Kubica's infamous crash in Canada - in each of these cases no-one suffered any significant harm. Yes there have been injuries, Panis in Canada 97, Schumacher in Britain 99, and Burti in Spa 01. But life threatening events have been very rare, only Massa in 09 after being hit by a loose spring from Barrichello's Brawn GP car during qualifying for the Hungarian GP caused real concern. So with such a promising safety record, one that has been continually improving, how have we found ourselves in this situation. The way I see it, any severe incident can only come about as a result of a 'perfect storm' of circumstances, because conventional accidents have been anticipated by the designers and people who set the crash tolerance regulations. The outcome of each accident is the result of a combination of four contributing factors:
The Car
Car design is at the core of injury prevention, because it is often the only constant from on incident to the next. This includes the composition of the car itself in terms of the central monocoque safety cell, and the features designed to restrain the driver. These design principles have resulted in vehicles that have been able to withstand heavy impacts with the barriers and with each other. The example of Kubica's accident is a relevant one, as in that case the car was essentially stripped down to the safety cell - all of the crash structures absorbed the energy effectively. As it has been said on many reports, core car design principles - sound as they are - could not of averted the outcome of Bianchi's accident. Primarily because cars are built on the basis that the designers know what surfaces the car will likely impact and at what angle - be this a concrete wall like in Canada or Sochi, Armco like Monaco, tyre barriers or another racing car. None of those design considerations take into account an impact with a recovery vehicle because the likelihood is so small - hence the 'perfect storm' effect.
Modifications have been suggested in the light of this incident, focussing on head protection as it is the driver's head which is the most at risk. This is not a new topic - after serious incidents in 2009, firstly with the death of Henry Surtees in a F2 race at Brands Hatch. Surtees was struck by a wheel that was cast off from a separate crash in front of him. A week later Felipe Massa was also struck by debris and was lucky to survive. No modifications were made to open wheel formulae design regulations. Then in 2012 the startline accident at the Belgian GP raised the point of head protection once more, when Romain Grosjean's car went over the front of Fernando Alonso's car, dangerously close to his head. This time plans were put in place for the testing of cockpit canopies, similar to those used on fighter jets. Experiments were held where tyres were fired against a test canopy - but the train of thought went no further. Williams' director of vehicle performance Rob Smedley has come forward and suggested that installing such a canopy wouldn't be difficult. Naturally there are operational difficulties when considering using a canopy, such as how it fairs in the rain and how easy would it be to extract a driver following an accident - especially if the car is upside down.
Within the context of Bianchi's accident - don't think it is the physical strength or design of the cars that can be called into question. I would suggest that the way in which the car collapse is one of the reasons Jules survived the hit, because if the roll hoop and engine cover hadn't broken away the car would not have continued on it's trajectory towards the barriers, instead coming to rest underneath the crane. A canopy solution is a reaction to a problem that doesn't exist - responding with a grandiose gesture instead of delving deeper into the root cause of the accident and correcting it. Something that F1 has been excessively guilty of in recent seasons.
The Track
Circuit design has continually improved with new design philosophies, the most of the tracks I first saw in 1997 have been completely refurbished since. Introductions of tarmac run-off areas and improved barrier technology have prevented many accidents from being more serious. For example Sergio Perez crashed into a Tech-Pro barrier in Monaco's Nouvelle chicane, in the past that would have been a couple of tyre stacks roped together. The advanced barrier prevented lasting injuries. In the US concrete walls on ovals are now lined with compressible structures to lower impact forces. New Tilke tracks are defined by acres of run-off space, where you would have enough time for tea and a toastie before you'd actually hit something.
But on some of the older race tracks on the calendar such as Suzuka larger modifications to the track are limited by the layout and physical geography of the area. The Dunlop curve in question backs immediately onto the exit of 130R - therefore run-off cannot be extended in this area. But if adding more run-off was the solution, then what do we do with street circuits - which while conventionally slower, have no room for error. The proposed layout for the 2016 race in Baku is quoting speeds of 340km/h on a street circuit - surely this is far riskier than anything Suzuka has to offer. Just like the cars, the configuration of the track can't be blamed for this event - Dunlop corner has been like that for decades, and over the course of those decades there have been wet races. Yet this is the first incident of it's kind since 1994 in which Martin Brundle spun in the wet at Suzuka - not at Dunlop however - and made contact with a marshal attending another incident.
Procedures
In the end it comes down to how the incidents were handled, and how the competitive nature of the drivers on track can take over. Several things combined to create the outcome we were faced with, the worsening conditions, tyres at the end of a stint, and the use of a heavy recovery vehicle. Of course the predominant question is how a racing car can be in the situation where it can make contact with the tractor. Mobile cranes have been used on timeless occasions to extract cars following an accident, it is standard procedure - the problem is how the rest of the field is controlled while the recovery process is being carried out. Depending on the nature of the incident being cleared away there are two procedural solutions that can be used. One being the safety car, brought out to slow the field down to allow the marshals and crews to work safely. The second option is more localised, using double waved yellow flags - which means that when the other drivers pass through the sector they have to "slow down and be prepared to stop". Now we all know that nobody actually obeys that to the letter of the law - and only make a measurable reduction in pace. An article by Gary Hartstein says that drivers were shown to curtail their speed by 0.3s - any more than that and they would lose ground to their competitors.
Given that there were marshals and recovery vehicles on the exit of a wet high speed corner, a lift of 0.3 seconds is not going to really slow anyone down to a safe speed and minimise the risk. I'm not going to suggest that Bianchi span off because it was his own fault - because every car is doing the same thing, it is a de-facto standard effectively, one which is considered acceptable by the stewards. This comes back to complacency really, the concept of believing nothing will go wrong and therefore failing to enforce the yellow flag rules. Alonso ran into an incident in Brazil 2003 also in the wet - didn't lift for yellow flags because the sport doesn't really mind too much if you don't - and crashed heavily into the debris left by a previous accident. He was unable to make the podium and the race was red flagged. In fact in the same race, six cars individually span off on the same corner and hit the same tyre wall - and back then a heavy recovery truck was put onto the track to clear up when there was a clear risk of a repeat accident. This is the problem that brought about the consequences of Sunday's race - race control seems to treat driver responses to all levels of yellow flag situation the same. A small lift and you're doing enough - more than that and you lose out to those around you.
Is there a solution
So if fighter-pilot canopies and universal tarmac run-offs are not the answer, what is, and will we ever see it put into practice. It seems while F1 is messing around with double points, DRS and standing restart rules they often forget that there are more pressing regulations that need to be fixed. These big announcements grab the headlines and fuel Bernie's bank accounts - drawing in interest. Smaller internal changes don't have quite the same rappor with the audience and therefore are ignored. The governance of clearing away incidents has been cited as a problem for 20yrs - Brundle always points out that the field should be neutralised whenever a recovery crane is on site. Since then nothing has really happened - Liuzzi hit a similar tractor (at a much, much slower pace) in 2007 at the Nurburgring - nothing was done then. There is no problem with the use of a recovery crane, in a corner where another incident was likely Sutil's car couldn't be left there - but the enforcement of double yellows is so weak that cars were still passing at almost racing speed. This is the bit that is not acceptable, especially given the conditions and the likelihood of a second crash, the field has to be slowed down.
At Le Mans this year, the ACO introduced the idea of a 'slow zone' a concept that didn't seem feasible when announced - but worked well in the race. Effectively it enforces safety car speeds for a localised sector of the track, so even if some one did spin - like Ericsson did - they wouldn't be going fast enough to have the same accident. It does need to be enforced correctly, such that is isn't possible to cheat the system - with the yellow flags we've seen drivers raise a hand to TV cameras to acknowledge the warnings but keep their right foot planted. This sort of thing needs to be eradicated - the WTCC finale in Macau was quickly turned into a farce by drivers not fully appreciating the flags, and marshals in attendance were put severely at risk.
Therefore we still have two options in the event of an incident that requires a crane or other recovery vehicle - option 1: throw the safety car, which adds a large delay to the race but is very easy to implement. In Indycar the safety car is introduced for every stationary car as a precaution - so a race can have upwards of 5 or 6 safety car events. But their safety car durations can be smaller - in Sinagpore there was a 20 minute delay for some front wing debris, where is in the US that would take two or three laps to clear. Option 2 is to introduce a slow-zone around the crash site and allow racing on the rest of the lap, this would reduce the number of safety car interventions per season but is far more complex to implement. In order to prevent anyone from taking advantage the system would have to be automated - like the DRS activation - applying a speed limiting function when the car is in the zone. It becomes more complex at the point where the zone starts - getting each car to decelerate down to the restricted speed so that cars in a battle don't run into each other as their speeds are over-ridden. For now I think option 1 is more feasible and certainly achievable with immediate effect, as no additional systems need to be introduced. But in the long run a move to option 2 might be more effective, it will take more time to develop and validate.
So in conclusion if anyone is still here this far down an extensive document, I can suggest that F1 is still safe, the cars and tracks are built to exacting standards for safety. Standards that can be rigorously tested and verified, meaning the technical aspects of the sport can be measured and assessed for their capabilities. It comes down to the human and sporting aspects of the regulations - the authorities have become complacent over the years because of the very high safety standards of the cars and venues. Therefore they've let certain things slip in the meantime, procedural solutions and racing regulations haven't kept up - buried under unnecessary gimmicks and showmanship. No enforcement of yellow flag rules in race conditions, and an "it'll be alright" attitude has put marshals at risk and now put a driver in intensive care. Enough with this canopy business, fix the problems that exist today and instead of focussing on answers to questions nobody is asking.
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