Lessons learned from Japan 2014 - Bianchi's Legacy

Greetings Internet, 

Over the weekend the world woke to the sad news that Jules Bianchi had lost his fight to recover from the events of the 2014 Japanese GP, having spent the last nine months in a coma. It is disturbing that in this day and age, with the knowledge and technological resources the sport has at its disposal we are faced with the fact that we are reading a driver's obituary. I for one never envisaged having to write a post contemplating the darkest of outcomes, but we can't ignore the fact that the sport is inherently dangerous. It brings back memories of the 2013 running of the Le Mans 24hr race - the first time I had the misfortune of hearing the announcement of a driver fatality on live television, and experiencing the surreal numbness that comes with something so shocking. Allan Simonsen's death was all the more surprising as the accident seemed so much more innocuous - an impact that I'd seen many, many times before in several different types of car, one that had never resulted in the same consequences. Despite the naturally saddening news, Bianchi's death was less of a shock because the news of his condition had been filtering through the motorsport news channels for some weeks before hand. Reporting that there were no signs of improvement or recovery from the coma. Jules' death following the injuries sustained in Japan marks an end to 21 years without a driver fatality. A figure that will be bandied about in every news report covering the most recent tragedy. But we can't forget that several marshals have also been killed in the intervening period, most recently Mark Robinson was fatally injured when recovering Esteban Gutierrez's Sauber after the 2013 Canadian GP - another incident involving the use of recovery tractors. Any fatality is upsetting and is a stark reminder of our own fragility - but a tale of such potential and such achievement cut short is even more tragic.

In the immediate aftermath of that day in October the world was desperate for answers, explanations and a way of making sure it never happens again. The FIA conducted an enquiry into the incident and all of the safety procedures and precautions that surround the issues of car retrieval and the use of heavy lifting equipment. That report concluded that all the procedures were carried out as they are supposed as per the conventional standards. Yet it still went horrifically wrong, and the full magnitude of that came to its terminal conclusion on Friday evening. Through the benefit of hindsight, of course there were solutions that could have been used to prevent this - throwing a Safety car to remove Sutil's car sitting close to the top of that list.  In every event of this nature there is a justifiable need not just to explain how and why it took place, but to learn from the causes so that they can be mitigated and ultimately prevented. Wheel tethers were introduced after track worker fatalities in Monza and Melbourne when they were struck by wheels that had become detached from cars during an accident. HANS devices were made mandatory after a spate of injuries in NASCAR and ultimately after the death of Dale Earnhardt. Those changes proved instrumental in saving lives throughout motorsport as a whole - but the dangers cannot be completely erased and these systems are not infallible. Fighting accidents with ever improving technologies - while a valid tactic - results in a constant power struggle between engineers developing ever faster cars, and the circuit designers developing methods of stopping the cars with things go wrong. The struggle between performance and safety will continue until the end of time - the most recent example is the re-introduction of lower noses in F1. A lower nose reduces the risk of the nosecone intruding into the cockpit area - but is less aerodynamically efficient than a high nose. No technology will be foolproof and 100% safe - so another safety aspect is to look at the post-collision procedures and overall culture that the sport on a global level had slipped into over the past decade. 

In recent years a degree of complacency can be seen emerging, not just in F1 but worldwide - because the racing had been so safe for so long, drivers emerging through the junior series have been born into a world where they feel invincible. This season's FIA F3 championship is a perfect example - it is nothing short of a miracle that nobody has been injured in a series of enormous accidents in the category. GP2 and GP3 has been rife with questionable driving standards, competitors forcing each other off the track with the utmost disrespect for each other's safety. Fortunately by the time the fortunate minority of drivers make it up to F1, most of the alarming driving habits are watered down as F1 has a lower tolerance than some of the junior categories. Even in the light of what has happened to Bianchi - driving standards in the lower formulae haven't improved, and in the F3 Euroseries they have deteriorated. Admittedly, driving standards in the form of wheel-to-wheel racing played no part in the events that claimed Jules' life, and it has to be said that within the F1 paddock and on the racetrack Bianchi was impeccably respectful of those around him. But in terms of preventing another catastrophic event the younger generation doesn't seem to be fully aware of the dangers that surround them. Fortunately the stewards are starting to take a harder stance on dangerous driving - even to the point where they cancelled the third race at Monza before it ran to completion due to the number of collisions. It has been argued that the deterioration of driving standards in some categories is due to the FIA funnelling all comers into categories which award super-license points - thus meaning they receive less experience in other formula because the FIA doesn't value that experience. 

But this complacency doesn't stop with the drivers themselves - rule makers and race organisers have been just as guilty. The most glaring example is the Indycar governing body - after a horrifying accident in the 2011 Las Vegas season finale which claimed the life of Dan Wheldon; the drivers, teams and the organisers vowed never to race like they did on that day. Yet only a few races ago this season less than four years later - at Fontana 'pack racing' returned. Drivers and teams were angry that it had been allowed to happen, Tony Kanaan, who finished second said he feared for his safety during the race - which inevitably ended with a significant accident. Fortunately this time no-one was injured and Ryan Briscoe walked away from a scary flip. 

The ACO could also be said to be guilty not learning from past incidents, as mentioned earlier Alan Simonsen collided with an armco barrier and suffered fatal injuries as a result of improper barrier provisions - no tyre walls or compressible structures were present at Arnage corner. The steel fence itself couldn't flex to absorb the impact because of a line of trees pressed up against it. Arnage corner itself was corrected accordingly but those lessons were not carried around the remainder of the circuit - especially at the high speed porsche curves. A concrete barrier at the exit of the section remained unprotected, a high risk corner that has seen large accidents in the past, and in this year's race an Aston Martin GTE was edged wide when being lapped by Hulkenberg's LMP1 car and ended up hitting the concrete barrier head on. The driver Roald Goethe suffered cracked vertebrae in the collision - again due to improper barrier protection. I think that the world over - teams, drivers, circuit owners, series organisers and officials need to pay a little more attention to past events and be continually looking to improve.

It should be pointed out that I am not laying any of this complacency at Bianchi's door - Jules' actions were the actions of any other driver entering Dunlop corner. Actions that are fundamentally embedded in the mentality of any driver and team starting any race in the world. For example in a V8 supercar race at the end of the 2014 season, not long after the Japanese GP, on a street circuit in Sydney - drivers for the Red Bull Australia team were instructed to pick up the pace once a safety car was deployed. Thus illustrating that the interests of safety can be often overlooked in the interests of competition. I've seen several comments across the internet that say that a driver who is willing to slow significantly for yellow flags risks being replaced by one who will keep his/her foot down. The FIA report on Bianchi's accident pointed out that one of the major contributing factors was that Jules didn't slow enough for the flags - but none of the drivers did, it is their job to exploit every opportunity to gain time on the opposition. A yellow flag zone represents another opportunity to do so. However this culture is in place because the FIA and the stewards take a particularly ineffective stance on policing driver responses to yellow flag scenarios. Thus giving everyone an effective carte blanche to abuse the limits as they see fit. 

Since that race, the FIA and GPDA have been working on learning from what took place - and nine months on a couple of rule changes have been added to the standard race procedures. Would any of them prevented what happened in Suzuka, it is impossible to say - it can be hoped that they would, as that would mean the probability of such an event recurring is greatly reduced. Because of the issues surrounding handling yellow flags and trackside vehicle recovery, and the conflicting interests of the teams and the safety requirements one primary solution has been introduced. The introduction of a virtual safety car (VSC) the VSC acts as an intermediary stage between a low-risk local single yellow flag, and a full safety car intervention. The concept stems from endurance racing, where all competitors are required to slow to a pre-determined speed across the lap until the incident has been cleared. A VSC-style solution is used in endurance races such as the Dubai and Nurburgring 24hrs, because the number of entrants is so large collecting them in one queue is difficult - and in the case of the Nurburgring 24hrs because of the extreme length of the circuit. This approach is referred to as a 'Code 60' as drivers are mandated not to exceed 60km/h. In the Le Mans 24hrs a modification of the Code 60 is used in the form of 'Slow zones' - which essentially is a localised Code 60 or VSC only spanning the site of the accident. Theoretically this makes more sense - especially on a larger track - allowing racing around 90% of the lap, but enforcing a speed cut past the incident site.

But that causes problems during the 'deceleration zone' a section of the circuit prior to the designated slow zone for drivers to slow to the required speed. This is another area for drivers to dry and lose as little speed as possible - and during the race several drivers cited nearly being involved in accidents due to differing deceleration speeds. Confusion between the electronic system and the manned marshal posts in marking the start of these zones caused an a high speed accident involving an Audi prototype. 

Virtual safety cars take away the responsibility for slowing down from the drivers, because given the choice they will always drive as fast as possible. So through enforcing a speed limit, this choice is removed from the equation, and by applying the VSC condition to the whole lap alleviates any issues with gaining an advantage in the deceleration zone. This means that any cars can be collected, using recovery vehicles if necessary, while the rest of the field are travelling at a sensibly reduced pace. Because this is a new mechanism for temporarily neutralising a race, there are some issues with when and where to use the system. So far in 2015 the VSC has only been called into action twice - and one of those was for less than 30 seconds before it was upgraded to a full safety car. The only full deployment of the VSC was last race in Silverstone - to cover the removal of Carlos Sainz's Toro Rosso from the outside of Club corner. This served as a good example of when to use the VSC - removing a single vehicle which with little to no debris to recover or barriers to check. The same could be said for Ericsson's spin in Malaysia - but that was covered under a full safety car. Taking this into consideration, would a VSC been the appropriate call for Sutil's accident in Suzuka - I would say that it would certainly have helped. This would have slowed the race down and then looking at the race conditions it may have been upgrading to a full safety car. Which was only deployed after Bianchi's accident at the time. Using the VSC allows marshals to assess the situation under safer conditions and bring any required lifting equipment into position. 

I am glad that the FIA has made important changes to the regulations, to provide race control and the stewards with more options when it comes to handling on track incidents. But through time I hope that they gain confidence in selecting which option to use when a car does go off the circuit - it is no use having these mechanisms if they are ignored. Yet at the same time we don't wan't to fall into the same trap that blights American motorsport where the safety car is excessively overused, there is a balance to be struck here - and the VSC fits that. Of course that doesn't mean that the problem is solved and it is business as normal until the next tragedy - several other near misses across the spectrum of motorsport have highlighted highlighted other weaknesses which are currently being investigated. Issues surrounding closed cockpits and design of recovery vehicles are still causes for concern and remain under continuous review like all aspects of safety within the sport.

Nothing can be done to reverse the events of that race, but lessons can be learned to lower the risk of it happening again.